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INCE IT FIRST bubbled from the ground in Pennsylvania in
1859, oil has affected the economy. And since its inception in
1960, OPEC has shaped oil prices. Do oil and OPEC still have
a strong hold on the economy? This article examines oil-price
movements from a long-term perspective and assesses the
consequences for economic activity.
It seems we have less reason to be concerned about higher
oil prices today. Even though oil prices tripled over the past 18
months, they are moderate by historical standards. Given its market
share, large reserves and low production costs, OPEC will remain
dominant in world oil markets. Both the national and regional
economies have diversified away from energy-intensive and energy-
producing industries. Consequently, our economy is less sensitive to
oil-price changes. Still, a dramatic and persistent increase in oil prices
would slow the U.S. economy while stimulating the economies of 
energy-producing states.
World Oil Market
OPEC has been a major factor in the recent volatility of oil prices,
with help from fluctuating world demand. Prices dropped to a low
of about $11 per barrel in the last week of 1998, then climbed to a







The Best of Both Worldsoil prices over the past 18 months re-
flects greater-than-anticipated demand
and decreased supply. Mexico, Norway,
Russia and Oman agreed to cut output
along with OPEC, pushing prices up.
This increase resembles the 1979–1981
price hike, which led to a severe reces-
sion (Chart 1).
When adjusted for inflation, however,
crude prices are about the same as they
were in the early 1970s and much lower
than in the early 1980s. Prices doubled
to near $10 per barrel in early 1974. In
today’s dollars that is equivalent to $33
per barrel. The high of $38 reached in
1981 would be $72 today. Similarly, for
gasoline prices to reach the highs of the
early 1980s, they would have to average
$2.55 per gallon nationally. The current
national average price is about $1.50
per gallon.
The United States is a mature oil-pro-
ducing region. Our production peaked
in 1970 and has been declining since
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about the same as
they were in the
early 1970s.(Chart 2). In 1970, U.S. production was
about 20 percent of world oil output.
Today U.S. output is about 10 percent.
OPEC’s share has also declined from
about 50 percent of world output in
1970, but it is still a hefty 40 percent
today. When Russia, Norway and Mex-
ico decided to join OPEC in cutting out-
put last year, these countries produced
60 percent of world output.
Although the United States contributes
about 10 percent of world output, we
consume 22 percent; hence, we import
about 55 percent of what we consume.
As the U.S. economy grows and domes-
tic oil production declines, this percent-
age will rise. A high dependency on im-
ported oil is not necessarily a bad thing.
Japan and many European countries im-
port 100 percent of their oil. Because a
major share of world oil production
comes from politically unstable parts of
the world, however, imported oil may
pose political and security risks. World
dependence on oil from OPEC, which
holds 65 percent of world reserves, will
continue into the future (Chart 3).
OPEC recently decided to keep the
price of oil in a band that would corre-
spond to $25–$30 per barrel for West
Texas Intermediate crude oil (Chart 4).
OPEC will increase production if prices
go above $30 for 20 days and reduce
production if prices fall below $25.
OPEC does not consider a price above
$30 sustainable because such a price
leads to oil conservation and an in-
crease in non-OPEC supply. A price
below $25 is bad for OPEC finances. It
is estimated that for each $1 drop in the
price of oil, Saudi Arabia loses $2.5 bil-
lion in annual revenue.
Oil Prices and U.S. Economic Activity
A considerable body of economic re-
search suggests that oil-price fluctua-
tions have figured prominently in national
economic activity since World War II.
(For examples, see Hamilton 1983; Balke,
Brown and Yücel 1999; and Brown and
Yücel 1999). Oil’s influence on the
economy may be weakening, however.
Rising oil prices preceded eight of
the nine post–World War II recessions
(Chart 5). The 1960 recession is the one
exception. A small price hike preceded
the recession in 1970. In the 1950s and
1960s, the economy was so sensitive to
oil prices that small price increases led
recessions. Since the mid-1980s, rising
oil prices have not always led reces-
sions. Oil-price fluctuations seem to have
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Chart 5
Oil Prices and Recessions, 1947–2000
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SOURCES: National Bureau of Economic Research; authors’ calculations.from energy-intensive industries and 
toward the high-tech industries that
characterize the new economy.
Economic research suggests that ris-
ing oil prices contribute to inflationary
pressures (Chart 7 ). (For examples, see
Balke, Brown and Yücel 1999; Brown
and Yücel 1999). This relationship was
obscured somewhat in the 1970s, how-
ever, when U.S. inflation appeared to
lead increases in the price of oil. A ris-
ing U.S. price level put downward 
pressure on the real value of the dollar 
in international exchange. The weaker
dollar boosted the dollar-denominated
demand for oil and helped push oil
prices upward. At the same time, OPEC
sought to maintain the purchasing
power of its oil exports by increasing
the price.
In the early 1980s, U.S. disinflation
reversed the process. Since the mid-
1980s, however, movements in inflation
and oil prices have roughly coincided.
We have also seen a weaker link be-
tween rising oil prices and core infla-
tion—that is, inflation in all items ex-
cept food and energy. This measure of
inflation is thought to provide a better
signal of underlying inflationary pres-
sure because it is less susceptible to the
fluctuations associated with food and
energy prices. A recent study (Hooker
2000) on oil prices and inflation shows
that, since 1980, oil-price changes have
had little effect on core inflation. Before
1980, though, oil shocks contributed sub-
stantially to core inflation. The weaker
link suggests monetary policy may have
been more effective in combating the
inflationary effects of oil-price shocks in
the past 20 years.
Nevertheless, rising oil prices seem
to lead to higher interest rates (Chart 8).
If consumers see oil-price increases as
temporary, as is suggested by futures
prices, they will also consider the loss
of output and income associated with
higher oil prices to be temporary. To
smooth their consumption across periods
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less effect on economic activity today
than in the past.
Rising oil prices can be indicative of
a classic supply-side shock (Brown and
Yücel 1999), signaling increased scarcity
of energy, a basic input to production.
Consequently, output and productivity
growth slow. The decline in produc-
tivity lessens real wage growth and 
increases the unemployment rate at
which inflation accelerates. Under a
monetary policy that maintains a con-
stant nominal GDP, the price level rises
by the amount GDP falls. If consumers
expect the increase in oil price to be
temporary, they will attempt to save 
less or borrow to smooth out their 
consumption. This will boost interest
rates.
Research by Carruth, Hooker and
Oswald (1998) shows a strong relation-
ship between oil prices and the unem-
ployment rate. Changing oil prices led
movements in the unemployment rate
from the 1970s through the 1990s 
(Chart 6 ). Unemployment declined with
oil prices from 1982 through 1990 and
in the late 1990s. Rising oil prices retard
productivity growth and raise the rate of
unemployment at which inflation accel-
erates. Falling oil prices stimulate pro-
ductivity growth and lower the rate of
unemployment at which inflation accel-
erates. The chart suggests this relation-
ship weakened in the late 1990s, as 
the economy increasingly turned away
Chart 6
Oil Prices and Unemployment


























SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Chart 7
Oil Prices and Inflation






















SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.of lower income, consumers will attempt
to save less or borrow, which will boost
interest rates.
Some of the recent increases in the
federal funds rate may be part of a gen-
eral increase in interest rates that results
from higher oil prices (Brown and Yücel
1999). To the extent the Federal Reserve
does not allow the federal funds rate to
rise with these increases in market in-
terest rates, inflation would be more 
evident in the core measure of inflation.
One reason recent oil-price hikes
may have had less negative impact 
on the national economy is that the
amount of energy consumed in produc-
ing each dollar of GDP has declined. As
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Green-
span has said, “Today’s GDP is lighter
and smaller.” However, this develop-
ment is not new. The largest declines in
energy consumption per dollar of GDP
came during the 1970s through early
1980s, when oil prices were rising
rapidly (Chart 9). The declines slowed
after oil prices collapsed in 1986. Our
informal calculations suggest the U.S.
economy is about one-third less sensi-
tive to oil-price fluctuations today than
it was when oil prices were at their
height in the early 1980s. Our calcu-
lations also suggest the U.S. economy 
is about half as sensitive to oil-price
fluctuations as it was in the mid-1970s,
when real oil prices were about the
same as they are today.
Oil Prices and Economic Activity
in the Southwest
As the national economy has diversi-
fied away from energy-intensive indus-
tries, Texas has moved away from energy
production. Texas’ diversification is evi-
dent in its gross state product data. In
1981, the oil and natural gas sector 
accounted for about 20 percent of gross
state product. In 1997—the most recent
year for which we have data—oil and
natural gas production accounted for
about 8 percent of gross state product
(Chart 10).
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The U.S. economy 
is about one-third
less sensitive to 
oil-price fluctuations
today than in the
early 1980s.
Chart 8
Oil Prices and Interest Rates
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Chart 9
Energy/GDP Ratio Falling
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from
Department of Energy and Bureau of
Economic Analysis.industries and energy production is
making the states more alike in their 
responses to oil-price movements.
— Stephen P. A. Brown
Mine K. Yücel
Brown is director of energy economics and
microeconomic policy analysis and Yücel 
is a senior economist and research officer
in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.   References
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Because the energy industry is less
prominent in the state, Texas employ-
ment is about 75 percent less sensitive
to oil-price movements today than it
was in 1982. Similarly, employment in
Louisiana and Oklahoma is about 80
percent less sensitive, and New Mexico
employment is about 70 percent less
sensitive (Chart 11).
We estimate that rising oil prices
would have hurt economic activity in 37
states and the District of Columbia in
1982, as shown in Chart 12 (Brown and
Yücel 1995). For the other 13 states, ris-
ing oil prices would have boosted eco-
nomic activity in 1982.
At the present (2000), only eight
states are helped by rising oil prices.
Economic activity in Kansas, Mississippi,
Montana, Utah and West Virginia has
changed so much that these states are
now hurt by rising oil prices rather than
helped, as they were in 1982. More im-
portant, nearly all state economies that
would have been hurt or helped by ris-
ing oil prices in 1982 are now less sen-
sitive to oil-price increases. Diversifica-
tion away from both energy-intensive
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Chart 11
Energy-Producing States Less
Helped by Rising Oil Prices
Percent change in employment
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SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.Y VIRTUALLY EVERY popular
measure, the U.S. economy is
performing better today than in
decades. Between October
1999 and March 2000, GDP
grew at an annualized 6.3 per-
cent and productivity at 4.6 percent.
The next month, the expansion was a
record 109 months long and unemploy-
ment hit a 30-year low of 3.9 percent.
The nation has added an average of
162,000 jobs per month since the ex-
pansion began.
Just about every commonly cited sta-
tistic says that U.S. living standards have
risen markedly over the past decade.
With more Americans earning more
money than ever before, people can 
afford to consume more, save more—
or both. Perhaps more important, it has
never been easier for ordinary Americans
to find work or move to a better job.
Yet there are other ways—less cele-
brated but no less important—the
strong economy has improved the
everyday lives of ordinary people.
Among these pleasant side effects are
those on crime, welfare, charity, the
budget deficit and minority well-being.
The current expansion began in March
1991. But because America has had
only eight months of recession since
1982, it can be seen as the second in-
stallment in a long boom that began
about 210 months ago.
Crime
Estimates of the annual cost of crime
in the United States range as high as 
$1 trillion.
1 Many factors influence an
individual’s decision to commit crimes:
the likelihood of being caught, the
severity of punishment and the poten-
tial reward, to name a few. But high 
on the list are the job and income
prospects one faces in pursuing lawful
work. Research shows that economic
incentives play a key role in influencing
crime, just as they do in many other de-
cisions in life.
2 So it makes sense that
crime rates, especially those economi-
cally linked—robbery, burglary, larceny
and motor vehicle theft, for example—
fell in the 1990s (Chart 1).
3
What’s remarkable about the decline
is that all major types of crimes fell
sharply. While non-economic factors
such as demographic changes and more
prisons can gradually reduce crime rates
over time, what’s remarkable about the
1990s is the sharp decline in virtually all
major types of crime. Crime in every
category has declined each year since
the current expansion began, with the
exception of small one-year increases in
murder (1993) and larceny (1995). De-
clines have been so substantial that
most types of crime are less prevalent
now than they were in 1970. During the
current expansion, robbery has fallen
by 46 percent, murder by 45 percent,
burglary by 41 percent, motor vehicle
theft by 39 percent and larceny-theft by
23 percent.
4 These numbers show that
one pleasant side effect of the nation’s
long economic boom has been a sub-
stantial reduction in crime.
Welfare
Since the social safety net was cre-
ated in 1936, numerous programs have
been established to assist out-of-work
Americans. As conceived, the nation’s
welfare system would rescue unfortu-
nate but well-intended citizens from 
occasional hard times. In practice, how-
ever, the system also created incentives
for able-bodied and otherwise compe-
tent individuals to opt out of the labor
market in return for welfare benefits—
cash, food and food vouchers, medical
care, rent subsidies and others.
While America’s growing economy
has been providing ever-greater incen-
tives for individuals to work, for those
in some categories (such as the less
skilled), an increasingly generous wel-
fare system has been providing incen-
B
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Chart 1
Criminal Offenses per 100,000 People, 1970–99


















NOTE: 1999 data are calculated using growth rates from the Uniform Crime Report, January–June 1999.
SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation.tives to seek social welfare. By 1994,
the number of Americans receiving cash
welfare payments had reached an all-
time high of 14.2 million, or 5.5 percent
of the population (Chart 2).
Two factors changed the welfare cost–
benefit calculus: the landmark welfare
reform law enacted in 1996 and the pro-
longed economic expansion. It is diffi-
cult to pinpoint how much of the de-
cline is due to the current expansion,
and the General Accounting Office
credits both factors for reducing welfare
recipiency. As Chart 2 shows, however,
the welfare rolls began to fall roughly
three years into the expansion, two and
a half years before welfare reform was
signed into law.
The decline in welfare recipiency has
been broad-based, touching every state.
Looking at recipiency on a region-by-
region basis provides further evidence
that economic growth has helped cut
welfare rolls (Chart 3). Regions with the
greatest percentage decline in per
capita recipiency in the ’90s tended to
be those with greater percentage growth
in median per capita real income.
5
The fraction of Americans on welfare
has declined by well over half—from
5.5 percent in 1994 to 2.5 percent in
1999. Welfare rolls are down by 53 per-
cent over that period—from 14.2 mil-
lion in 1994 to 6.8 million in 1999. Of
course, the strong economy can’t elimi-
nate the need for welfare. But fewer
Americans are on welfare today than 
at any time since 1967—clearly another
pleasant side effect of the nation’s long
boom.
Charity
In recent years, stories of self-absorbed
millionaires and Internet billionaires have
convinced many that Americans have
abandoned their commitment to charity.
The data, however, provide evidence
that Americans are contributing more
than ever.
To gauge the extent of increased giv-
ing, it’s helpful to compare the growth
in giving per capita over the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s. The years 1970, 1982
and 1991 are business cycle peaks, so 
it makes sense to calculate and com-
pare the growth in real giving per capita
over three periods: 1970–82, 1982–91
and 1991–99.
The data show that real per capita
contributions to charity declined at an
average annual rate of 0.2 percent from
1970 to 1982, then rose at an annual av-
erage of 1.2 percent during the expan-
sion of the 1980s. Since 1991, however,
real per capita charitable contributions
have grown at an annual average of 4
percent (Chart 4 ).
6
More recent data show an even
stronger increase in giving. Since 1995,
total real charitable contributions have
grown 9 percent annually, rising from
$135.9 billion to $191.7 billion in 1999.
Real giving per capita has risen 8.4 per-
cent annually over the period. Real con-
tributions from individuals—the biggest
category of giving—have grown 7.1 per-
cent annually, rising to $750 per adult.
Other forms of charity have grown even
faster, with foundations upping their
contributions by 17 percent in 1999
Page  8 Southwest Economy   July/August 2000
Chart 2
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 1960–99
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Chart 3
Income Growth and the Per Capita Decline in 
Welfare Recipiency: 1990–98
Percentage decline in welfare recipiency
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SOURCES: Department of Health and Human Services; Census Bureau.age wages earned by blacks and His-
panics have generally fallen short of
those earned by whites. Unemployment
rates among blacks and Hispanics have
lingered well above those of whites.
And poverty has plagued the minority
population.
Has the recent economic expansion
helped minorities? Since 1993, the
poverty rate has dropped considerably
among Americans of all races, espe-
cially minorities. From its 1990s peak of
7.6 percent (in 1993), the poverty rate
among white non-Hispanic families fell
alone. Roughly half of all charitable
contributions in the 1990s went to reli-
gious organizations such as churches,
but the fastest-growing types of chari-
ties deal with social issues, such as en-
vironmental concerns.
From these data, it is clear a charita-
ble renaissance is under way, powered
in large part by the strong economy.
The Budget Deficit
The federal budget deficit has caused
concern for more than three decades.
Since 1969, the government has amassed
debt of over $5 trillion. In the first full
year of the current expansion (1992),
the deficit reached a record $290.4 bil-
lion, and many analysts expected
deficits in excess of $400 billion annu-
ally by the end of the decade. But al-
though federal spending has grown by
about 4 percent annually since 1992, the
budget has moved into surplus. Current
projections call for a surplus of almost
$200 billion in fiscal 2000 and an end to
the federal debt by 2013, or even 2009.
7
The primary factor improving fiscal
balance has been income tax revenues,
which rose from $468 billion in 1991 to
$880 billion in 1999 (Chart 5 ). This in-
crease is largely due to growth in per-
sonal income, which expanded from 
$5 trillion in 1991 to almost $8 trillion
last year. However, effective income tax
rates have climbed, too. Between 1991
and 1999, the average citizen’s federal
income tax bite rose from 9.2 percent to
11.3 percent—a 23 percent increase.
How did this happen? Part of the an-
swer lies in a 1993 tax hike, but part is
due to the way the tax system handles
growth. A little-known aspect of the tax
code is that real economic growth raises
the proportion of income subject to
taxes—and pushes people into higher
tax brackets in the process. This means
average Americans don’t just pay more
taxes when times are good, they actu-
ally pay a higher percentage of their in-
come. Bracket creep isn’t something
that just happens to individuals when
they get better jobs. It’s designed into
current national policy by a code that
adjusts tax brackets only for inflation,
not for real economic growth.
8
Owing partly to the effects of strong
economic growth on real taxable in-
come, the average income tax rate rose
significantly in the 1990s. But while we
can lament a tax policy that shifts an
ever-greater portion of society’s output
to government as economic growth
proceeds, we can also celebrate the
growth that has helped reduce govern-
ment red ink.
Minority Well-Being
Historically, most minorities have
fared worse than whites on standard
measures of economic well-being. Aver-
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
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Annual Growth in 
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Chart 5
Federal Income Taxes and Budget Balance, 1970–99
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SWE SWE SWE Beyond the Border Beyond the Border
HIS YEAR’S BIGGEST trade battle
so far has been over permanent
normal trade relations between
the United States and China. The
U.S. House of Representatives
voted in May to permanently
normalize trade relations, paving the
way for China’s membership in the
World Trade Organization. The issue is
now before the U.S. Senate. The vote
has sparked controversy, perhaps be-
cause the details of the WTO accession
agreement are not well understood. The
most striking detail of the agreement,
which is essentially a work in progress,
is that the United States does very little
in exchange for much reduction in
China’s protectionism.
This one-sided liberalization is not
unusual. In trade agreements between
the United States and developing coun-
tries, the latter do most of the liberaliz-
ing. The reason is simple. The United
States is already more open to imports,
foreign investment and international
trade in services than many other coun-
tries, especially developing ones. In the
China–U.S. agreement, U.S. tariffs do
not go down, and other types of trade
protectionism are generally not reduced
either. Important from the Chinese per-
spective, however, is the United States’
commitment to make permanent the
trade privileges it has been extending to
China one year at a time.
Chinese tariffs do come down. Chi-
nese industrial tariffs are at an average
ad valorem value of 24.6 percent. The
average will fall to 9.4 percent. Despite
this large reduction, average Chinese
tariffs are markedly higher than those of
industrial countries. According to some
estimates, the average industrial tariff 
among the WTO member nations is
under 4 percent. While China’s trade re-
duction is important, it is not NAFTA. The
WTO is not a free trade organization.
In addition to tariff reductions, China
will reduce nontariff barriers. Import
quotas will be phased out. Import licens-
ing will ebb. Government monopolies
on the importation of some products
will fade, as will government decrees
that only certain enterprises may import
products the government itself doesn’t
monopolize. Arcane government purchas-
ing programs—essentially  “buy China”
programs—will be made transparent and
opened to foreigners.
Foreign investment rules will also
change. Foreign firms will not have to
agree to local content requirements,
technology transfer requirements or
minimum export requirements. Some of
the biggest openings involve trade in
services rather than in goods. Retailing
and wholesaling, from which foreigners
have been excluded up to now, will be
opened. Foreign firms will be permitted
to hold up to 50 percent interest in tele-
communications operations. Right now
in China, foreign banking operations
can only do business with foreign firms
and in designated locations. By the time
the accession is five years old, foreign
banks will be able to do business in
Chinese currency with both Chinese
companies and individual customers at
any geographic location. This is a sig-
nificant opening.
The results of the U.S.–China negoti-
ations last November are only part of a
larger agreement—China’s accession 
to the WTO. WTO membership means 
not only trade openings for China but
also access to the organization’s dispute
settlement mechanisms. China will no
longer be subjected to arbitrary unilat-
eral decisions involving so-called ad-
ministrative protectionism, such as anti-
dumping. Administrative protectionism
exists within the WTO framework, but
this protectionism is more fully rational-
ized than that experienced by countries
in some bilateral relationships.
The WTO agreement includes tariff
and nontariff reductions that will be
“multilateralized.” This means each of
the bilateral agreements reached be-
tween China and every other country 
in the WTO will be merged. The best
deal that China gives to any particular
country will, in the merged agreement,
be extended to all the WTO countries.
Thus, the agreement between the
United States and China can only get
better.
—William C. Gruben
Gruben is vice president and the director 
of the Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
U.S.–China Trade Relations: 
The Best of Both Worlds
T
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detail of the WTO
accession agreement
is that the United
States does very little




For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
HE TEXAS ECONOMY has cooled slightly from a
strong first quarter but remains more robust than a
year ago. High energy prices and continued strength
in the high-tech sector have combined to sustain eco-
nomic growth in recent months. Anecdotal evidence
suggests, however, that higher interest rates are slow-
ing construction activity.
Crude prices remained high throughout June at around $30
per barrel. Oil exploration and extraction continue to increase
in response to the price rise. The Texas rotary rig count has
increased at an annual rate of 43.4 percent since the begin-
ning of 2000.
Manufacturing activity expanded in April and May. Produc-
tivity gains and extended working hours led to output growth
of 4.7 percent (annual rate) over the two-month period. Man-
ufacturing employment grew at a strong 2.7 percent in May
after declining for most of the past year.
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI† Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
5/00 125.9 129.0 146.6 559.0 1,078.8 1,591.5 6,020.7 9,396.6 1,905.1 743.6
4/00 126.7 128.4 146.4 559.7 1,076.4 1,563.6 6,011.4 9,357.5 1,899.0 742.6
3/00 127.2 128.0 146.7 554.8 1,081.8 1,560.3 6,006.7 9,350.3 1,893.0 739.8
2/00 126.7 128.0 146.1 552.0 1,081.8 1,553.2 5,979.9 9,313.0 1,890.2 738.3
1/00 125.7 128.2 146.2 548.5 1,081.4 1,551.6 5,962.7 9,290.4 1,886.4 738.0
12/99 126.4 128.2 145.9 542.5 1,079.4 1,544.1 5,956.3 9,268.2 1,895.6 734.1
11/99 124.6 128.2 145.8 537.6 1,077.7 1,534.8 5,929.3 9,225.2 1,896.5 734.5
10/99 124.3 127.5 145.6 532.9 1,077.9 1,533.6 5,911.6 9,201.6 1,892.9 734.0
9/99 123.4 126.7 144.4 532.1 1,080.5 1,535.1 5,891.6 9,183.7 1,889.7 734.1
8/99 123.9 126.7 144.0 526.5 1,081.1 1,532.1 5,879.5 9,163.2 1,886.4 733.4
7/99 124.2 126.3 143.5 527.0 1,083.3 1,514.7 5,864.2 9,132.7 1,889.5 729.4
6/99 124.2 125.2 144.4 525.6 1,080.8 1,534.0 5,845.8 9,130.6 1,885.4 729.3
* in thousands.
† Texas Industrial Production Index.
 
Construction activity is showing signs of cooling from a
very strong pace. Nonresidential construction contract values
declined in May. Growth of residential sales slowed from an
annual rate of 20.1 percent in April to 5.5 percent in May.
Construction employment declined by 700 jobs in May after
posting strong growth the first four months of this year.
The Texas labor market remains very tight and was further
squeezed by the hiring of census workers. The Texas unem-
ployment rate dropped from 4.5 percent in April to 4.4 per-
cent in May. The energy, manufacturing and service sectors
have all reported difficulty in increasing and maintaining pay-
roll levels.
After rising in February and March, the Texas leading index
fell in April and May. This dampening in the leading index
suggests a possible cooling in employment growth over the
next six months.
—John Thompson
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  11SWE SWE SWE









to 6.1 percent by 1998.
9 Among
blacks, the drop has been greater,
with the rate declining from 31.3
percent to 23.4 percent—a nearly
8 percentage point drop. Poverty
rates among Hispanic families fell
from 27.3 percent to 22.7 percent
over this period, which is espe-
cially remarkable given the large
number of poor Hispanics who
migrated to the United States in
the 1990s.
The minority unemployment
picture is even better. During
America’s long boom, overall un-
employment has fallen from its
1980s high (in 1982) of 9.7 percent
to a 1990s high of 7.5 percent (in
1992) to 3.9 percent in April 2000.
Unemployment rate gaps, how-
ever, have shown steeper declines
(Chart 6 ). The gap between black
and white unemployment rates
narrowed from 10.3 percent in
1982 to 6.4 percent in 1991 and 3.7
percent in April. The Hispanic–
white gap went from 5.2 percent
in 1982 to 3.9 percent in 1991 and
1.9 percent in April.
Minorities have faced many ob-
stacles in the 20th century. But
after nearly two decades of strong
economic growth, falling unem-
ployment rates and intensifying
global competition, these obstacles
have lessened. Minorities have
seized the opportunities the New
Economy affords to narrow the gap
with the broader population and
provide a better standard of living
for themselves and their families—
another pleasant side effect of the
strong economy.
— Jason L. Saving
W. Michael Cox
Saving is an economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, and Cox is senior 
vice president and chief economist.   Notes
1 See David A. Anderson, “The Aggregate Burden of Crime,”
Journal of Law and Economics, October 1999, pp. 611–42.
2 The seminal article on the subject is Gary S. Becker, “Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, March/April 1968, pp. 169–217. More re-
cent work that confirms the importance of economic factors
to criminal behavior is Ralph C. Allen and Jack H. Stone,
“Market and Public Policy Mechanisms in Poverty Reduc-
tion: The Differential Effects of Property Crime,” Review of
Social Economy, June 1999, pp. 156–73.
3 Both homicide and forcible rape have also declined since
1992. Although initially one might view these crimes as un-
related to the economy, there is good reason to believe they
might be indirectly linked to job and income prospects.
Working citizens have less time to commit crime, and they
are apt to feel more included in society, less frustrated and
marginalized and therefore less antisocial.
4 The rate of motor vehicle theft continued downward in the
1990s, but it has been in decline since the early 1980s.
In some cases, technologies introduced since the early
1980s have likely reduced crime as much as the economic
expansion has. Examples are car alarms and home security
systems, largely unavailable until the early 1980s but now
found in nearly a quarter of U.S. residences and vehicles.
5 The regions in the article and Chart 3 are the standard nine
U.S. Census divisions.
6 The figures used here are real giving per adult to help con-
trol for demographic changes.
7 The $200 billion includes a $40 billion non-Social Security
surplus.
8 Under the tax code, all Americans could be in the 39.6 
percent tax bracket someday. The obvious solution is to
change the way tax brackets are indexed. Tax brackets could
be raised by the full extent of nominal income growth an-
nually, not just the portion due to higher prices.
9 Data are the most recent available.
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